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1 Can pragmatists give a satisfactory account of the way our thoughts and claims are
causally  and  normatively  constrained  by  a  mind-independent  world?  The  question
regarding  the  relations  between  pragmatism  and  objectivity,  or  pragmatism  and
realism,  has  animated  pragmatists  and  its  critics  alike  since  the  beginnings  of  the
movement.  Pragmatists  have  been  accused  of  all  the  bad  -isms  of  philosophy:
subjectivism, idealism, relativism, irrationalism, to name but a few. Its most fervent
critics saw the legitimacy of these accusations confirmed in Rorty’s rejection of the
philosophical  importance  of  concepts  such as  objectivity  and truth.  This  sparked a
number of responses from new pragmatists who want to dissociate themselves from
Rorty and defend a pragmatist account of truth and objectivity, among which we can
count Hilary Putnam, Cheryl Misak, Jeffrey Stout, Henryk Reidenfelt, Robert Brandom
and Huw Price.
2 Levine’s book represents an important and original contribution to this century-old
debate.  It  situates itself  more specifically within the discussion on the centrality of
experience  or  language  for  pragmatism.  This  discussion  pits  philosophers  such  as
Rorty,  Brandom,  and  Price  who  think  that  the  classical  pragmatists’  notion  of
experience  is  outdated  and  should  be  replaced  by  an  exclusive  focus  on  linguistic
practices, against those who think that the reconstruction of the concept of experience
is one of the most valuable insights of the classical pragmatist tradition. Levine’s own
view is  that  it  is  precisely  Rorty’s  eschewal  of  the  concept  of  experience  which  is
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responsible for his rejection of the idea of objectivity, understood as “the idea that we
are answerable to the world in addition to other subjects” (p. 2). Those amongst the
new pragmatists who follow Rorty’s lead in rejecting experience, but depart from him
in attempting to  construe  objectivity  on the  basis  of  linguistic  communication,  are
bound to fail at this task because of their shared premise. Accordingly, the main goal of
Levine’s book is to defend a pragmatist account of objectivity that relies primarily on
the classical pragmatists’ theory of experience: “Whereas most new pragmatists think
that  objectivity is  best  rehabilitated solely  in communicative-theoretic  terms –  i.e.,  in
terms that can be cashed out exclusively by capacities that agents gain through taking
part  in linguistic  communication – I  argue that  rehabilitation can best  be achieved
through experiential-theoretic means” (3). 
3 By  pointing  out  the  shortcomings  in  the  new pragmatists’  accounts,  Levine’s  book
motivates a new reading of  the classical  pragmatists  as a source of  inspiration and
solution without thereby promoting an outright return to their views. Levine makes it
clear that he is not advocating a replacement of the communicative-theoretic account by
an experiential-theoretic one, as if one had to choose between Dewey or Brandom. He is
rather claiming that experience is a necessary, and perhaps more primitive, condition
of our answerability to the world.
4 Levine’s experiential-theoretic account of objectivity is twofold. Levine makes a helpful
distinction between the question of “our grasp of the concept of objectivity, the concept
of  a  world  of  objects  and events  that  continue  to  exist  when  not  perceived  or
experienced” (addressed in chapters 3 and 4), and the question of “whether the content
of the empirical thoughts and judgments undertaken in light of this grasp are in fact
constrained by, and answerable to, the mind-independent world” (157) (addressed in
chapters 2, 5, and 6). In order to answer these questions, Levine also uses a twofold
account of experience, each aspect being captured by the German concepts of Erlebnis 
(broadly  construed  as  phenomenal  or  lived  experience) and  Erfahrung  (broadly
construed  as  an  experimental,  feedback-driven  learning  process).  Although  each
concept of experience plays a role in both sides of Levine’s account of objectivity, and is
present in both James and Dewey, Levine uses James’s account of Erlebnis in order to
answer the first question, while Dewey’s account of Erfahrung supplies the answer to
the second question.
5 One  can  already  appreciate  the  originality  of  Levine’s  contribution,  which  draws
extensively from two figures of the classical pragmatist tradition seldom appealed to in
the defense of a pragmatist realism or theory of objectivity. Peirce’s work seems to lend
itself more easily to this kind of project, as indicated by the extensive development of a
Peircian brand of realism in the past decades, amongst which we can cite the works of
Misak,  Christopher  Hookway  and  Claudine  Tiercelin.  The  reputation  of  James  and
Dewey, on the other hand, has somewhat suffered from Rorty’s creative appropriation
of their works and from the criticisms received in their days and in ours, whether from
Russell or Misak. 
6 Another  aspect  of  the  originality  of  Levine’s  work  is  his  focus  on  the  notion  of
objectivity. Most pragmatists have sought to answer similar questions in the terms of
the debate between realism and anti-realism that raged on in the 1980s and 1990s, and
whose most prominent pragmatist participants were Putnam and Rorty. The defense of
a pragmatist realism, in turn, has most often been done through an elucidation of the
concept of truth rather than objectivity, as in the case of Misak’s work. Perhaps this is
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due  to  the  widespread  assimilation  of  pragmatism  to  a  (usually  misunderstood)
Peircian or Jamesian theory of truth.
7 Levine’s shift of the discussion towards objectivity has clear benefits. First of all, the
realism  debate  has  traditionally  been  heavily  focused  on  metaphysics,  while  most
classical  and  new  pragmatists  want  to  avoid  asking  or  at  least  approaching
philosophical questions from this angle.  Their participation in this debate, with the
notable  exception  of  Putnam,  is  usually  forced  upon  them  by  critics,  pragmatists
having to answer the charge of holding incoherent anti-realist or relativist positions.
Secondly, the concept of objectivity is congenial to both new and classical pragmatism.
The  concept  of  truth,  on  the  other  hand,  is  of  less  importance  in  the  classical
pragmatists’ works than is usually thought (inquiry is, arguably, a more central and
primitive concept than truth for both Peirce and Dewey). Finally, many of the questions
that  interest  the  philosophers  engaged  in  debates  on  realism  and  truth  can  be
satisfactorily addressed by an account of objectivity, with the added value of answering
them from a refreshing angle. Realists insist that there is a mind-independent world
and a “way that things are” which is independent of what humans think, say, or do
about it; and most of them use the concept of truth as a norm of assertion and a goal of
inquiry  in  order  to  account  for  our  answerability  to  the  way  things  are.  Levine’s
twofold account of objectivity accounts for our grasp of  the first  idea (although its
office is not to give a proof for it) and shows how our beliefs are answerable to the world
in practice. 
8 The focus  on  objectivity  also  comes  with  its  restrictions,  of  course.  Levine  himself
acknowledges that  he is  less  concerned with the “epistemic” question of  “how our
inquiries  must  be  structured  so  as  to  issue  in  judgments  that  can  be  counted  as
knowledge” (5). Very little is said about inquiry, whether ordinary or scientific, or about
the relation between the structure of our assertions and the structure of the world. The
book does not  address  the question of  representationalism,  which is  central  to  the
works of Rorty, Brandom and Price. Because they trace their anti-representationalism
back to Dewey, this would have been another interesting angle for the kind of project
pursued by Levine, i.e., for a comparative and critical study of the classical and new
pragmatists – but it would have required another book.
9 The  structure  of  the  book  follows  Levine’s  argumentative  strategy  rather  than  a
chronological  order  of  exposition.  The  first  part  of  the  book (Chapters  1,  2  and 3)
presents a critical exposition of the new pragmatists’ accounts of objectivity, while the
second part of the book (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) is dedicated to the positive exposition of
James’ and Dewey’s experiential-theoretic accounts of objectivity. By structuring the
book in this manner, Levine sets the terms of the discussion in contemporary terms,
thus providing an easier point of entry into the classical pragmatists’ works for readers
who are less familiar with their views and terminology. 
10 The first  chapter sets the basis  for the general  argument defended in the book,  by
tracing back Rorty’s rejection of objectivity to his eschewal of sense experience. Levine
starts  by  rejecting  Brandom’s  own  genealogy,  which  situates  the  source  of  Rorty’s
hostility to objectivity in his views on the mental. Rorty promotes eliminationism with
regard  the  category  of  the  “mental,”  defined  by  the  incorrigibility  of  first-person
reports, after revealing its contingent and social grounds, and adopts the same strategy
with  the  category  of  the  “objective.”  Brandom’s  rehabilitation  of  Rorty  consists  in
showing that this eliminativist strategy is neither necessary nor preferable with regard
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to objectivity, and in developing a conception of objectivity consistent with Rorty’s idea
that it is we who grant authority to things.
11 Levine, on the other hand, argues that Rorty’s rejection of objectivity comes from his
strict separation between the causal domain and the normative space of reasons. The
same argument against the Myth of the Given leads Rorty to eliminate both sensation
(defined as prelinguistic sensory awareness) and objectivity (the idea that the world
can  normatively,  as  well  as  causally, constrain  our  thought).  Levine’s  criticism  of
Brandom at the end of the chapter brings to light two conditions that he thinks are
necessary for a satisfactory account of objectivity: first, it must include an “explanation
of  rational  constraint”  (besides  causal  constraint)  (40)  and  it  has  to  “capture  an
essential feature of objectivity – namely that thought and perception that is objective is
constrained by something that is beyond our control,” which implies that the category of
objectivity cannot be “something we engineer” (41).
12 The first chapter sets the tasks for the rest of the book: explaining why Brandom’s
account of objectivity is not satisfactory, and how the classical pragmatists’ conception
of experience does not fall prey to the Myth of the Given and other pitfalls that new
pragmatists have sought to avoid.
13 Chapter  2  deals  with  what  seems  to  be  Brandom’s  most  promising  attempt  at
accounting  for  objectivity  for  those  who,  like  Levine,  want  to  defend  an  account
primarily based on experience. As Levine points out, while Brandom rejects sensory
experience understood as Erlebnis, he includes experience as Erfahrung as one crucial
component  of  his  account  of  objectivity.  Experiential  learning  is  understood  as  a
feedback cycle through which one corrects one’s prior commitments, which he also
calls the “Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) cycle” in Between Saying and Doing (2008).
14 Levine’s first criticism is that Brandom’s account wavers between intellectualism and
atomism. The former conflicts with the phenomenological fluidity of action, and the
latter  cannot  account  for  the  fact  that  human  activity  is  “not  only  launched  by
acknowledgement  of  a  practical  commitment  but  is  also  guided and controlled by  it
through time” (54). As an alternative to Brandom’s overly intellectualist pragmatism,
Levine opposes a Deweyan conception of practice involving bodily habits and skills.
Levine  then  criticizes  Brandom’s  atomism  by  making  an  interesting  application  of
Dewey’s criticism of the “Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896) to Brandom’s TOTE
cycle (61-6). 
15 The  second  part  critically  examines  Brandom’s  attempt  to  account  for  “rational
constraint” – what makes perceptual judgments rationally answerable to the world –
without resorting to Erlebnis. Levine rejects Brandom’s two solutions, namely, his social
and reliabilist externalism, according to which rational constraint “can come from the
rational assessment of one’s perceptual judgments by other scorekeepers” (72), and his
appeal  to  the process  of  “double-checking” (75).  Both are deemed “incoherent” for
Levine, the former leading to a vicious regress (74) and the latter to a self-contained
coherentism  (78).  Levine  concludes  with  a  presentation  of  the  interdependence
between Erfahrung and Erlebnis in Dewey’s account.
16 This chapter gives a good overview of Brandom’s experiential account of objectivity
(with a helpful introductory section on Brandom’s rationalist pragmatism) as well as
Levine’s alternative Deweyan account, developed at length in the second part of the
book. If the reader wants to have a good sense of Levine’s argumentative strategy and
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of the overall position defended in this book but only has time to read one chapter, it
should probably be this one.
17 The third chapter is concerned with our grasp of the concept of objectivity.  Levine
contrasts  Brandom’s  and  Davidson’s  communicative-theoretic  accounts  with  the
perceptual-theoretic accounts of Strawson and Evans, according to which “the concept
of objectivity is the result of an agent’s grasp of the system of spatial concepts that
informs their rudimentary ‘theory of perception’” (83). Levine’s main thesis is that “the
communicative-theoretic conception of objectivity depends in a nonsymmetrical way
on the form of objectivity that is identified by the perceptual-theoretic approach” (83). 
18 Levine thinks that Brandom successfully defends an account of objectivity as “attitude
transcendence”  based  on  “discursive  structure”  only  (85).  He  fails,  however,  at
defending  a  similar  account  of  “the  authority  of  objects  and  our  consequent
responsibility to them” (ibid.). The gist of Levine’s argument is that Brandom’s appeal to
de re ascriptions is not sufficient, since their representational content is interpreted in
social-perspectival  terms  (94).  Levine  also  shows  how  Davidson’s  “triangulation”
depends on communicators already having a “grasp that there is a common space in
which oneself, other, and object are housed” (109). This leads him to the examination of
Strawson’s and Evans’s accounts, which locate our grasp of the concept of objectivity at
a  more  basic  and  primitive  level,  namely,  in  our  notion  of  a  spatial  world  and  of
existence unperceived.
19 Drawing  on  the  results  of  the  previous  chapter,  Chapter  4  offers  a  revision  of
Strawson’s and Evans’s accounts based on James’s own account. Levine points out that
for  Strawson  and  Evans,  our  concept  of  objectivity  is  something  we  “bring  to  our
experience  of  objects  through the  use  of  a  rudimentary  theory  of  perception”  and
therefore has “its origin off stage” (123). For James, on the other hand, our grasp of
objectivity is “based in our experience of existence unperceived” (ibid.). This experience
is  not  that  of  the  classical  empiricists,  but  the  “much richer  notion” of  Erlebnis.  It
involves, amongst other things, the selectivity of the mind, thought intending the same
object,  the  fringe  of  consciousness,  and  the  temporal  dynamics  of  consciousness.
Levine’s main point is that, for James, our conception of existence unperceived does not
come from spatial reasoning, but it comes from (i) our experience of objects as persisting
through our  changing  experiences  of  them,  and  (ii)  our  simultaneous  experience of
presence and absence, namely, of objects which are, in one field, “vividly present,” and
in another, “part of the vague marginal more” (155). 
20 Chapter 5 examines Dewey’s account of experience as a “tribunal for thought” that is
both “independent of, and yet homogeneous with, thought” (158). Dewey’s account is
presented as an answer to the problems raised by Rorty’s and Brandom’s separation
between the causal realm of sensation and the normative realm of rationality, and only
partially resolved by John McDowell’s minimal empiricism in Mind and World (1994).
McDowell’s  solution  consists  in  seeing  sensation  as  an  actualization  of  conceptual
capacities  (167).  Dewey,  on  the  other  hand,  sees  the  “operations  that  organize
experience [as]  not  primarily  cognitive  but  practical  or  teleological”  (170),  through
habits  rather  than  inferences.  The  main  particularity  of  Dewey’s  account  is  his
consideration of the temporal and reconstructive aspect of thought: “thought does not
come about primarily to endorse an already given experiential content, as it does for
McDowell; rather, it comes about when there is no clear content to be had” (176). Hence, it
is  the  reconstructed  experience  that  eventuates  as  the  consequence  of  an  action
Levine Steven, Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Experience
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
5
directed by  thought  which stands  as  the  tribunal  for  thought.  The  chapter  is  very
efficiently laid out: it sets the problem in the terms of Dewey’s own dilemma between
the “seesaw” of the dualists’ Given of sensation and the idealists’ coherentism, echoing
the  previous  discussions  of  Rorty  and  Brandom,  and  goes  on  to  contrast  Dewey’s
position with McDowell’s solution to that problem. 
21 While  the  previous  chapter  focused  on  Dewey’s  instrumentalist  phase,  Chapter  6
focuses on Dewey’s later naturalistic empiricism. Levine presents Dewey’s account on
its own terms, before comparing it to McDowell’s account of “second nature,” arguing
that “Dewey’s account of experience as ‘second natural’ can support a realist theory of
answerability while McDowell’s can’t” (218). Levine then responds to Rorty’s claim that
Dewey’s account of experience falls prey to the Myth of the Given. He convincingly
argues that, while Dewey does blur the line between cognitive and noncognitive states,
perceptual  experience  is  not  “Given  in  a  mythical  way,”  in  the  sense  of  having
epistemic  authority  on  thought  or  action  without  being  mediated  or  capable  of
mediation  by  reasons  (228).  For  Dewey,  all  experiences  are  “mediated  by  prior
operations of reflective problem solving and reason giving” and “admit of potential
reason giving in becoming tensional or indeterminate” (229). However, it is surprising
that Levine did not also appeal to Dewey’s extensive criticism of perception as a “case
of  knowledge,”  Dewey’s  point  being  precisely  that  perceptual  experience,  in  its
immediacy,  has  no  intrinsic  cognitive  value.  In  Experience  and  Nature  (1925),  Dewey
introduces a further mediation besides the ones Levine already pointed out: the use of a
perceptual  experience  as  a  sign  of  (unperceived)  objects  or  conditions  is  what  can
properly be said to have cognitive or epistemic value. 
22 Levine took up and succeeded in the task of creating a lively, extensive and productive
conversation  between  the  classical  pragmatists  and  more  recent  figures  in  post-
analytic  philosophy.  Their  differing  philosophical  starting  points,  backgrounds  and
terminologies make this kind of work a challenging enterprise. It is in fact rare to find
such in-depths  discussions  of  both sides  of  the  dialogue.  The  studies  of  James  and
Dewey in particular are often primarily exegetical, with the regrettable consequence
that their works are sometimes relegated to the domain of the “history of philosophy.”
On the other hand, when their ideas are used in contemporary discussions, it is often at
the expense of a careful reading of their works – Rorty’s selective and creative reading
of Dewey being an extreme example of this tendency. Avoiding both pitfalls, Levine’s
combination  of  careful  scholarship  and  critical  engagement  is  surprisingly  evenly
distributed  between  Brandom  and  Dewey,  Davidson  and  James,  Strawson  and
McDowell. For this reason and the ones already mentioned, Levine’s book represents an
important contribution to pragmatist philosophy. 
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